書 名○信任的力量 (2008)
　A Question of Trust
作者○　Onora O' Neill
導讀○失去的信任，可以恢復嗎？（沈雲 驄）

這是個欺騙的時代。

習慣欺騙與被騙的人，如今都在高 度不信任的氣氛中，共同生活、繼續對話。儘管憂心的研究者不斷提出建言，希望能重建我們社會中良好的信任基礎，但看看每天所發生的新聞事件，這個社會的﹁ 信任危機﹂，似乎依舊一天天的惡化。在這本小書中，政治哲學家昂諾娜‧歐妮爾為這個龐大且沉重的疑問，提出簡潔而有力的答案，發人深省。

歐妮爾與芮斯講座

擁有美國哈佛大學博士學位的昂諾娜‧歐妮爾，曾先後任教於美國與英國多所知名大學，目前是英國劍橋紐罕學院院 長，多年來活躍於歐美政治哲學領域，也是少數榮獲英國女皇冊封爵位的知名學者。二○○二年，歐妮爾應英國國家廣播公司（British Broadcasting Corporation，簡稱ＢＢＣ）之邀，擔任著名的「芮斯講座」（Reith Lecture） 學者。

芮斯講座是ＢＢＣ為了紀念該公司首任執行長約翰‧芮 斯（John Reith）而設立的講座，一九四八年至今，該公司每年都會邀請重要的學者針對關鍵話題舉辦講座，並在廣播節目 中播放。例如美國史學家丹尼爾‧波斯丁（Daniel Boorstin）、二○○三年過世的印裔學者艾德華‧薩伊德（Edward Said，講座內容輯結為《知識份子論》一書）倫敦政經學院院長安東尼‧紀登斯（Anthony Giddens） 等，都曾先後擔任該講座的座上賓。

這本《信任的力量》（A Question of Trust），就是依據歐妮爾在「芮斯講座」的講稿整理而成。選擇「信任」這個題目，一方面是由於英國（以及全 球其他國家）近年來不斷爆發的重大政治與社會事件，例如此起彼落的政治醜聞、企業弊案、公共衛生與安全危機等，不斷挑起人民的不安全感以及對週遭一切事務 的疑慮。二方面，則是歐妮爾認為目前關於﹁信任危機﹂的主要論述，非但無法解決問題，甚至可能將人們引導到更危險的方向。本書原中譯本《我們為什麼不再信 任》曾於二○○四年間出版，一度在華文世界知識圈引起熱烈討論，但幾年過去，許多國家依舊陷在信任危機的泥淖中，無法自拔。
不斷惡化的信任危機

無 論哪個國家，幾年來的民意調查都指向同一個答案：從政府、企業、媒體到各行各業的專業人士，被公眾信任的程度都在快速滑落。特別是在政治上，人民似乎對政 府充滿不信任。硬是要打伊拉克的美國總統小布希、貪污醜聞頻傳的泰國前總理達新、處心積慮要延任的南美洲強人查維茲，只是幾個比較明顯的例子。

在 台灣，就更不必說了。政黨輪替前如此，換黨執政後也沒有什麼改善。這點不需要什麼統計調查，隨便找幾個人問問，就不難感受到台灣人對於政治人物的信任度有 多低。領袖言行不一，官員口若懸河，政客極盡詭辯，政策反覆無常，都是人們不再信任政治人物的理由。

台大政治系教授胡佛所主持的「東亞民主化與價值變遷：比較調查研究」計畫，在二○○一年間進行的調查顯示，將近 七成的台灣民眾「不信任政黨」，六成五的人「不相信國會」，「不相信中央政府」的也高達近五成。人民不信任政治人物的重要理由之一，是認為政治人物大多自 私自利，經常利用職務中飽私囊。有高達五成六五的台灣民眾認為「多數地方政府官員貪污」，另外有高達四成七五認為「多數中央政府官員貪污」。

換言之，從政府到政黨，無論中央或地方，政治如今是在人民高度懷疑的氣氛下運作。一般認為，這些政治人物必須為 這樣的現象負起最大的責任，無論是美國前總統柯林頓的緋聞案，英國首相布萊爾與美國總統小布希的攻伊行動，乃至於各種對台灣政治領導人的操守指控，這些質 疑雖然沒有直接摧毀這些人的權力，卻一再升高了人民對政府的懷疑。

媒 體的處境亦然。報紙與雜誌，電視或廣播，可信度和它們所供給的訊息數量成反比，媒體愈是瘋狂地供給資訊，民眾愈是對這些資訊的真實性質疑。超過半數的台灣 民眾根本不信任報紙，不信任電視的也有近五成。無論是新聞或綜藝節目，在政府與企業廣告主一再透過所謂的「置入性行銷」的侵襲下，在民眾心目中的可信度也 愈來愈低。

企業自然不必說了。汽車銷售員、廣告業者、保險 顧問，甚至銀行家、高階經理人，長期以來都不是民眾心目中值得信賴的對象，調查顯示這些人被民眾認為「誠實」的比率都低於兩成。除了不斷爆發的企業倒閉、 內線交易、五鬼搬運、惡性掏空等事件，最近幾年在「黑心電視」、「黑心玩具」、「黑心食品」接二連三引發公眾衛生與安全疑慮之後，更多人對企業感到反感， 普遍認為這些企業唯利是圖，什麼壞事都幹得出來。

更糟糕的 是，原先應該最容易獲取大眾信任的各種專業人士，如今也陷入信任危機。我們不敢輕易相信醫生，因為他們可能經驗不足而導致傳染病擴散，或者會為了自己的利 益而做出有害病人的建議（例如割除女病人的子宮）；我們不敢相信護士，因為他們可能會粗心大意打錯要命的針；我們不敢相信會計師，因為他們經常和企業勾 結，欺騙廣大的投資者；我們更不敢相信所謂的投資專家，因為害怕被這些人出賣，賠掉大眾所託付的血汗錢。

信任危機與懷疑文化

要證明這是史無前例的新信任危機，必須要有足夠的證據才行，歐妮爾認為，我們不能因為「有些」醫生或科學家不值得信任， 「有些」公司或政治人物不值得信任，「有些」騙子或同事不值得信任，就全盤否定了這些人。因為，信任「不是完美無瑕的」，能舉出一些例子，並不代表我們正 生活在史無前例或日益加深的信任危機中。

相反的，歐妮爾提 醒我們：我們儘管口中抱怨不斷，實際上卻繼續在主動付出我們對他人的信任，只是自己沒有察覺。譬如說，我們會喝自來水公司供應的水，吃餐廳端出來的食物； 我們會使用公眾交通工具，甚至會繼續搭飛機，包括那些信譽不佳的航空公司；我們會看電視、買報紙；我們會購買由藥廠製造出來的藥品，會相信醫生、法官，甚 至電視主播。

目前所流行的各種呼籲，在歐妮爾看來，未必是 建立信任最有效的辦法。因為，這些呼籲反而往往可能傷害信任。比方說，政治學者鼓吹的「陽光法案」，管理學界不斷討論的「公司治理」，效果可能未必如人們 想像中那般神奇。「如果我們三不五時就把植物的根拔起來看看長得好不好，並不能讓它長得茂盛。」歐妮爾說：「對政治或企業也一樣，如果我們經常把它們的根 拔起來，檢查看看是否每件事都進行得很透明可靠，恐怕也不能讓它們蓬勃發展。」換言之，我們為自己構築的嚴格負責制度，其實只會損傷信任，而不是維護信 任。

面對信 任危機

信任，不僅是政治與社會問題，也是經 濟威脅。諾貝爾經濟學獎得主勞勃‧艾羅曾經將「信任」視為經濟活動中「必要的潤滑劑」（essential lubricant）， 它不僅是交易的基礎條件，也是企業提升效率與降低成本的關鍵之一。而在那些公眾信任經常遭到背叛的國家，經濟實力也會受到嚴重打擊。比方說貪污，這種政府 官員背棄人民信任的行為，對於企業獲利與國家競爭力都有極大的傷害，研究發現清廉度愈高的國家，競爭力愈強，國民所得也愈高。反之，在貪污愈是盛行的國 家，企業獲利與民間財富都會遭到侵蝕。

當然，「信任」問題 在未來可能不再是太大的威脅。因為人們在習慣被欺騙之後，會衍申一套新的「選擇性信任」機制。大多數時候，人們似乎知道什麼時候該相信什麼人，什麼時候又 該對什麼人表示高度懷疑。例如廣告，能打動人心的已經愈來愈少；政治人物的宣傳口號所能發揮的威力，也較過去遠遠不如；甚至，很多人明明不信任某些政治人 物，卻還是會心甘情願把選票送給對方。

我們可能不需為自己 所有的不信任而自責，一來，有些人可能是永遠不能被信任的。比方說政治人物，人民必須永遠在不信任的基礎上睜大眼睛監督他們，政治愈是不清明的國家，愈是 應該如此，閉上眼睛對政治人物付出信任的人民，往往最後會付出愚蠢的代價。曾經榮獲普立茲獎、被譽為美國「最佳政治新聞記者」的美國《華盛頓郵報》資深專 欄作家大衛‧布羅德（David Broder）就說，「當你發現一個人很想當總統，而且會為此而花上兩年的時間來組織和競 選，這個人本來就不能被信任。」

何況，正如歐妮爾所言，我 們其實都知道，人生無法排除背叛。人需要信任別人，並非因為每件事是都可預測、可保證，而是因為人本來就生活在缺乏保證的情況之中。聲稱有「信任危機」， 歐妮爾說，只不過是說明了我們有個不切實的渴望：「希望擁有一個完全安全順遂的世界，讓一切會破壞信任的因素都一掃而空。」生在這個複雜的世界裡，我們除 了必須謹慎地付出信任，也必須如歐妮爾這樣，正確地認識所謂的「信任危機」。



***** 這篇立論不清楚 我注解其文抄公處

 

蘋論：喪失信任後果嚴重

任何政策都拒合作

救信心才能救經濟

提升人民對政府、對彼此、對經濟前景的信心，是馬政府的功課。這幾年馬政府重創了人民的信任，必須盡一切努力恢復民眾對經濟和政府的信心。做不到這個，就救不起經濟。 

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The Economy of Trust

The market has deficiencies of a kind for which ethics is a remedy. For example, the world is really filled with private information. There is inside information on products and in contracts. In these situations, there is a very strong possibility of one person using this information to take advantage of the other. If this happens frequently, a market may not exist at all because the buyers know that they don't know certain things, and that the sellers can exploit them. Therefore, it's not so much that there are potential unfair gains, but that such uncertainties about private information can make the market inefficient. In fact, if the problem is pronounced, the market may not exist at all. This is a situation that is studied particularly in insurance contracts; when the person insured may have private information about dangers unknown to the insurer, there is said to be “moral hazard” or “adverse selection,” phrases in the last forty years that have been imported into economic analysis from insurance literature.

There are various ways of handling these cases. One of them is the existence of morality. It turns out that to a considerable extent, people spontaneously do avoid taking excessive advantage of their inside information, their private information. Part of it is an understanding that even though I would gain by cheating, it would bring down the market if everybody did it. Of course, there can be a problem if one person says, “Well, if I did it, nobody will notice.” But then, if each person feels the same way the whole thing breaks down. Part of this behavior, though, is morality—the person doesn't cheat because he thinks it's the wrong thing to do. To get markets that work, you have to keep the other person from trying to cheat you at every moment. So morality is closely related to the workings of the market.
The other point, of course, is that people do have aims in life, and not just the grand achievement of material gains. They're concerned about others. This concern is the result of moral codes, which are developed and adopted through religion or through inculcation by other ethical sources. Certainly family relationships are marked by sacrifice. People are engaged in these relationships, and therefore, they devote their energies to acquire goods, not for the purpose of using them themselves, but for others.
So there are two aspects to this relationship. One relates to deep concern for others, and therefore touches upon the ends of economic activity. The other relates to the means of economic activity—the market. Morality plays a functional role in the operation of the economic system.
I don't know if it's so much prosperity as the prospect of prosperity that's dangerous. When you see a large potential personal gain, you may tend to feel that your virtue stands in the way. Now there is always the question of whether you can get away with something or can cut corners. You may find the pursuit of the material goods becomes an end in itself. But if you're a chess nut, you can also be a fanatic about playing chess in a way that gets in the way of doing good deeds.
Beyond a certain point, material goods can be symbols of success, but they can't really improve your life very much. Yet somehow these things have a way of becoming necessities. This is a real phenomenon. A number of psychologists and economists influenced by them have been arguing that happiness, whatever it may mean, is all relative to a previous standard of living. Relatively speaking, if you ask people, what they need to be thoroughly happy or how much income they need to really be thoroughly satisfied in an economic sense, they will typically answer 20 percent more than they've got now.
So while it's hard to define these terms and some economists don't like to make comparisons to which they can't give definite meaning, the typical thing you find is that rich people are happy and poor people not all that much less happy. If you compare countries, the average happiness in poor countries is the same as that in rich countries. (I'm not talking about extremely poor countries.)
One of the most striking things to me is some surveys [that measure happiness] that were done in Japan every few years, and, if I remember the dates, the answers in 1958 to 1988 were roughly the same. If you draw the curves relating happiness to income, you could not tell them apart. Now that was one of the most rapid periods of economic growth any country has ever experienced. They were pursuing material goods very, very vigorously. The pursuit of material goods may have very little to do with satisfaction.
On the other hand, divorce shows up as a big negative factor in measuring happiness. Material possessions play a role in happiness, I think, but it's just a role.
The danger of excessive reliance on the market, excessive perception of the market, is that it will obscure these other, clearly more fundamental courses of happiness or unhappiness. If you spend all your time at this instead of building up your relationships, there can be a real price to pay.
Well, I think you're asking two quite different questions. One is the use of economic explanations for things that you think of as part of other social science fields. It's true that economists do have something to say about other fields. Here the problem is that you get one-sided views—namely the economic perspective alone. You are not getting irrelevant statements; they are not meaningless statements, but just one-sided or incomplete. For example, some of the claims of economics about motivation, if correct, are applicable in other fields, and that was already pointed out when the utility theories were being developed in the 1880's and 1890's.
We see, by the way, that today psychology is invading economics—the whole field of behavioral economics. I believe that sociology should play more of a role in economics than it does. The way people behave in economics is partly influenced by how other people behave. It's easy to point out examples, but it's not so easy to construct a broad theory.
You raise a different question when you ask if things like metaphysics, theology, and moral philosophy play a role. Now you're coming to the question of the realm of value versus the realm of description. It's clear there are value questions of how one “ought to act” that are not going to be answered by a description of how people do it. Economics is not going to answer that question because it can't answer it. It's just a logically different thing.
We draw on religious sources about how one should act. We used to have, in the Middle Ages, very elaborate regulations of commerce—what was permissible commercial behavior and what is not permissible commercial behavior—derived from the laws on usury, the apparent prohibition on interest, [etc.] And the same thing is happening in Islamic law now, according to things I've read. There is the so-called Islamic banking, which claims not to charge interest—but does, as had happened in the Christian world also.
I don't want to say this is a void field, but I think the tendency when anyone thinks of a policy is that either individuals should do it for themselves or the state should do it. I'm struck by the fact that there are a number of situations where the policy expert doesn't understand that there are other institutions. There are many cases where these other institutions are probably superior, because the state has constraints on its actions, even the ideal state, leaving aside corruption and things like that. The state has to treat people in some uniform way. You don't want the state to start making too many distinctions or the potential for corruption or unfairness arises. So you have rules. Well, these rules tend to be broad and not very applicable to particulars. They don't take account of the individual case. In a way, you don't want them to, but that means that their effectiveness is reduced and something more flexible can be achieved by using intermediate institutions.
For instance, we have such institutions for distributing resources—what we call charitable groups. But such institutions also exist for agitation to bring matters to the public concern, changing people's values. I think the church is playing this major role in dissemination of these values and judgments and forming a focal point for them.
Well, I've been really concerned about ethical questions for a long time. I generally try to write things I feel sure about. As I get older, I'm a little more speculative and start to stimulate other people to think more about it. I think one of the critical things is the idea of what's called tzedakah , loosely translated as charity. It's the idea of responsibility for the welfare of others. Of course, then the problem comes, how do you institutionalize that? How do you get people to take these general beliefs and translate them into their own actions? And that's why collective actions of all levels play a role.
Like most economists, I find the market a very powerful instrument for achieving efficiency. We're not wasting things. We're not wasting resources. So whatever gets there, gets there. Nevertheless, there are a lot of limitations. For instance, there are intrinsic limitations like the kinds I sketched out earlier because of the existence of private information.
Religion calls for a sense of responsibility to the other, which the market, in principle, doesn't have. In fact, the markets do have it because they need fairness and efficiency to some extent. Yet the logic of markets means that such considerations have to be modeled as totally self-regarding, and people are not totally self-regarding. It's helpful to model them in that way, I'm not going to deny that; but it's not the set of values by which you want to live. Those values have to come from elsewhere, and this is what is emphasized by Christian and Jewish thought about the economy.

 

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