書介
The Sino-Japanese war
The start of history
How the struggle against Japan’s brutal occupation shaped modern China
China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival. By Rana Mitter. Allen Lane; 458 pages; £25. To be published in America in September as “Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-45” by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; $30. Buy from Amazon.com, Amazon.co.uk
AS JAPANESE troops advanced on the Chinese capital of Nanjing in 1937, Zhou Fohai, a senior official in the Chinese government, wrote in his diary of the panic and fear consuming the city. He anticipated the destruction and its implications for his nation: “China will have no more history,” he wrote.
The devastation that the Japanese invasion would wreak was indeed shocking. But as Rana Mitter shows in his illuminating and meticulously researched new book about the Sino-Japanese war, not only did Chinese history not end with the fall of Nanjing, but in many ways the war helped to create modern China. It was the anvil on which the new nation was forged.
Other historians point to the arrival of British gunboats in the 1830s, when industrialising Europe collided with ancient China, as the dawn of China’s modern age. But Mr Mitter, a professor at Oxford University, believes that the country’s war with Japan was more important because it reduced China to its weakest state. “Suddenly the circumstances of war made the concept of the nation, and personal identification with it, more urgent and meaningful for many Chinese.”
Mr Mitter may disappoint military wonks hoping for a blow-by-blow account of every skirmish. But this is not a military history. It is about the Chinese experience of war, the origins of the modern Chinese identity and the roots of a relationship that will shape Asia in the 21st century. It is about China’s existential crisis as it tried to regain its centrality in Asia.
It is also a story, pure and simple, of heroic resistance against massive odds. China is the forgotten ally of the second world war. For more than four years, until Pearl Harbour, the Chinese fought the Japanese almost alone. France capitulated in 1940, but China did not. Its government retreated inland, up the Yangzi river to Chongqing (Chungking)—a moment that would later be described as China’s Dunkirk (pictured). From there it fought on—sometimes ineptly, often bravely—until victory in 1945.
But as Japan’s imperial ambitions grew, China was the obvious place to expand. In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria, turning from mentor to oppressor. The full-scale invasion began in 1937. Mr Mitter does not skimp in narrating the atrocities; the stench of war infuses his narrative. But he paints a broader account of the Chinese struggle, explaining the history that still shapes Chinese thinking today.
Westerners are there as soldiers, missionaries and journalists. Christopher Isherwood and W.H. Auden, both English writers, arrived from the Spanish civil war in 1938. Isherwood’s diary exudes a pride shared by European progressives in the struggle against fascism: “Today Auden and I agreed that we would rather be in Hankow at this moment than anywhere else on earth.” Most Chinese people, suffering the Japanese onslaught without a ticket out, longed to be anywhere but Hankow. Up to 100m people (20% of China’s population) became refugees during the conflict. More than 15m were killed.
It is the voice of the Chinese, not that of the foreigners, that gives the distinctive tone to Mr Mitter’s narrative. From the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek to those of national journalists and middle-class Chinese fleeing the conflict, these first-person observations are woven skilfully into his chronicle of the battles and struggles. We all know about Iwo Jima, but who in the West has heard of the defence of Taierzhuang, when Chinese soldiers defeated superior Japanese troops in hand-to-hand combat? Yet its memory will continue to help shape Asian history. We know what Dwight Eisenhower thought at key moments of the second world war, but few have heard of Xiong Xianyu, an army commander who kept a diary of blowing up Yellow River levees to stop the Japanese advance. Nearly 1m Chinese died in the resulting floods. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The water flowed “like 10,000 horses”.
The war was seminal for China, and is still crucial for understanding the virulent anti-Japanese emotions of Chinese people today. The country was not just the forgotten ally, says Mr Mitter, but also the one most changed by the experience of war. Britain and America re-emerged into the boom-times of the 1950s. The Soviet Union was pushed to the brink and did not break. But while “battered, punch-drunk” China never surrendered, its old system of governance was destroyed.
The old order, symbolised by Chiang Kai-shek and his corrupt Nationalist party, had joined with Mao Zedong’s Communists to fight the Japanese. When victory came in 1945, it was clear the system could not continue. Mao presented a more attractive, less corrupt vision of a new Chinese state (one that he soon betrayed). His victory in the ensuing civil war (1945-49) and control during the cold war that followed ensured that a narrative of the Sino-Japanese war that did not include Communist heroism was airbrushed out.
Mr Mitter’s book rectifies some of those distortions of history. But the ghosts of the war with Japan have never been laid to rest. Chinese leaders still use the past as a stick to beat their neighbour. Now, from a position of strength, how China deals with its old mentor and enemy will be crucial in shaping the region in the 21st century.
AS JAPANESE troops advanced on the Chinese capital of Nanjing in 1937, Zhou Fohai, a senior official in the Chinese government, wrote in his diary of the panic and fear consuming the city. He anticipated the destruction and its implications for his nation: “China will have no more history,” he wrote.
The devastation that the Japanese invasion would wreak was indeed shocking. But as Rana Mitter shows in his illuminating and meticulously researched new book about the Sino-Japanese war, not only did Chinese history not end with the fall of Nanjing, but in many ways the war helped to create modern China. It was the anvil on which the new nation was forged.
Other historians point to the arrival of British gunboats in the 1830s, when industrialising Europe collided with ancient China, as the dawn of China’s modern age. But Mr Mitter, a professor at Oxford University, believes that the country’s war with Japan was more important because it reduced China to its weakest state. “Suddenly the circumstances of war made the concept of the nation, and personal identification with it, more urgent and meaningful for many Chinese.”
Mr Mitter may disappoint military wonks hoping for a blow-by-blow account of every skirmish. But this is not a military history. It is about the Chinese experience of war, the origins of the modern Chinese identity and the roots of a relationship that will shape Asia in the 21st century. It is about China’s existential crisis as it tried to regain its centrality in Asia.
It is also a story, pure and simple, of heroic resistance against massive odds. China is the forgotten ally of the second world war. For more than four years, until Pearl Harbour, the Chinese fought the Japanese almost alone. France capitulated in 1940, but China did not. Its government retreated inland, up the Yangzi river to Chongqing (Chungking)—a moment that would later be described as China’s Dunkirk (pictured). From there it fought on—sometimes ineptly, often bravely—until victory in 1945.
One mountain, two tigers
Asia has never had a strong China and a strong Japan. Their complex relationship in modern times began when Japan welcomed the West in the mid-19th century while China pushed it away. As Japan modernised, it became a model for Chinese reformers and a refuge for Chinese revolutionaries who opposed their own government’s insularity. Chinese students who went to Japan in the early 20th century included Sun Yat-sen, who led the 1911 revolution, and Chiang Kai-shek, the man who would lead the Nationalist government of China against Japan in the 1930s.But as Japan’s imperial ambitions grew, China was the obvious place to expand. In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria, turning from mentor to oppressor. The full-scale invasion began in 1937. Mr Mitter does not skimp in narrating the atrocities; the stench of war infuses his narrative. But he paints a broader account of the Chinese struggle, explaining the history that still shapes Chinese thinking today.
Westerners are there as soldiers, missionaries and journalists. Christopher Isherwood and W.H. Auden, both English writers, arrived from the Spanish civil war in 1938. Isherwood’s diary exudes a pride shared by European progressives in the struggle against fascism: “Today Auden and I agreed that we would rather be in Hankow at this moment than anywhere else on earth.” Most Chinese people, suffering the Japanese onslaught without a ticket out, longed to be anywhere but Hankow. Up to 100m people (20% of China’s population) became refugees during the conflict. More than 15m were killed.
It is the voice of the Chinese, not that of the foreigners, that gives the distinctive tone to Mr Mitter’s narrative. From the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek to those of national journalists and middle-class Chinese fleeing the conflict, these first-person observations are woven skilfully into his chronicle of the battles and struggles. We all know about Iwo Jima, but who in the West has heard of the defence of Taierzhuang, when Chinese soldiers defeated superior Japanese troops in hand-to-hand combat? Yet its memory will continue to help shape Asian history. We know what Dwight Eisenhower thought at key moments of the second world war, but few have heard of Xiong Xianyu, an army commander who kept a diary of blowing up Yellow River levees to stop the Japanese advance. Nearly 1m Chinese died in the resulting floods. “My heart ached,” he wrote. The water flowed “like 10,000 horses”.
The war was seminal for China, and is still crucial for understanding the virulent anti-Japanese emotions of Chinese people today. The country was not just the forgotten ally, says Mr Mitter, but also the one most changed by the experience of war. Britain and America re-emerged into the boom-times of the 1950s. The Soviet Union was pushed to the brink and did not break. But while “battered, punch-drunk” China never surrendered, its old system of governance was destroyed.
The old order, symbolised by Chiang Kai-shek and his corrupt Nationalist party, had joined with Mao Zedong’s Communists to fight the Japanese. When victory came in 1945, it was clear the system could not continue. Mao presented a more attractive, less corrupt vision of a new Chinese state (one that he soon betrayed). His victory in the ensuing civil war (1945-49) and control during the cold war that followed ensured that a narrative of the Sino-Japanese war that did not include Communist heroism was airbrushed out.
Mr Mitter’s book rectifies some of those distortions of history. But the ghosts of the war with Japan have never been laid to rest. Chinese leaders still use the past as a stick to beat their neighbour. Now, from a position of strength, how China deals with its old mentor and enemy will be crucial in shaping the region in the 21st century.
小心台灣成為中國的邊陲(南方朔)亞洲領袖: 中國?日本?
此中文版比法文版多約80頁值得注意的是參考資料幾乎都是英文
谁是亚洲领袖:中国还是日本?
内容简介 · · · · · ·
在汗牛充栋的中日关系研究成果中,来自欧洲 (法国)的亚洲问题专家对中日关系的论述可谓少之又少。迈耶教授的这本新书客观地介绍了在未来几十年亚洲一体化过程中,中国和日本作为两个主要大国在这个 将要形成的新的亚洲共同体中各自的拥有的优势和不足,描绘出中国和日本这两个受人尊敬的亚洲重要角色在未来二十多年中可能出现的场景,为广大的中国读者提 供了一个美国学者之外,既没有亲中倾向也没有亲日倾向的,来自法国或者说欧洲非盎格鲁撒克逊语系视角的中日关系的研究版本。
作者简介 · · · · · ·
克劳德·迈耶(Claude Meyer),法国高等社会科学研究院经济学博士,巴黎政治学院国际经济学教授。
目录 · · · · · ·
目 录导 论……………………………………………………………………………………………1
第1章 两个经济巨人的族谱 …………………………………………………………………10
中国和日本两国最近三十年所走过的轨迹,相互之间似乎并不存在相通之
处,甚至可以说是完全不同。不过,这两个亚洲国家的命运却休戚相关。这不
仅是因为两国之间的经济规模存在相似之处,而且也因为两国在漫长的历史风
云中积累起了许多深刻的记忆。
龙之觉醒…………………………………………………………………………………/12
相扑的韧性………………………………………………………………………………/19
交错的命运………………………………………………………………………………/27
第2章 强大但脆弱 ……………………………………………………………………………33
这两个亚洲大国的国内生产总值就占了整个东亚地区国内生产总值的77%,
占全球总量的15%。这两个国家虽然都是工业大国,但都十分脆弱。2008~2009
年的全球危机,与20世纪90年代对日本造成重创的经济危机一样,都使两个国
家的弱点暴露无遗,而这些弱点势必会影响到其未来的经济增长。
经济强国的武器…………………………………………………………………………/33
未来几十年的沉重挑战…………………………………………………………………/49
危机撼动巨人……………………………………………………………………………/70
第3章 日本,一个寻求“正常化”的经济领袖 ……………………………………………75
20世纪90年代的危机使它深刻认识到仅依靠经济发展所带来的国际地位存
在着许多局限,与此同时,周边环境所发生的深刻变化又使日本不得不重新思
考其防务政策。从此,日本开始了寻求“正常化”的进程,它要告别过去被人
另眼相看的日本,成为一个“正常”国家。为此,日本不仅采取了外交行动,
而且开始建立与自身经济实力相当的防务力量。
亚洲的经济领袖…………………………………………………………………………/75
日本渴望“正常化”……………………………………………………………………/95
第4章 中国,正成为全球强国 ………………………………………………………………109
作为一个活跃的区域行为体,中国凭借其在亚洲的影响来巩固自己的国际
地位,并逐步使自己获得了全球性大国的地位。它手中拥有两张日本无法拥有
的王牌:它是联合国安理会常任理事国,而且它还拥有核武器。
争夺亚洲经济领袖的追逐赛……………………………………………………………/110
一个区域和全球行为体的雄心…………………………………………………………/120
结 论 中国与日本正面交锋…………………………………………………………………137
未来中日关系可能出现三种设想情形:日本听命于未来中国霸权的可能性
不太大;两个敌对国家之间发生冲突;或者相反,两国根据各自互补的优势开
展携手合作。
附录一 印度和日本:建立全面战略和经济伙伴关系?……………………………………148
日本与印度之间的经济关系今后几年可能得到进一步加强,但两国间的战
略合作未来很可能使双边关系发生彻底改变。……未来亚洲的领导权很可能会
由日本以及中国和印度这两个新兴国家一起来分享。
经济关系不够密切………………………………………………………………………/149
建立全面战略和经济伙伴关系?………………………………………………………/155
附录二 日本的“辉煌十年”:20世纪80年代………………………………………………164
20世纪80年代,日本确立了自己全球金融强国的地位,然而金融权力朝着
有利于日本方向转移的进程到1989年底便宣告结束。与其他形式的实力一样,
日本金融实力的上升实际上是美国金融实力相对下降的结果。
概观:两大挑战,两种抱负……………………………………………………………/164
金融扩张…………………………………………………………………………………/176
附录三 “失去的十年”:20世纪90年代……………………………………………………188
除了“股市只涨不跌”这一盲目信仰破灭之外,另一个神话也在20世纪90
年代初破灭,这个神话便是:由于建筑用地十分有限,因而地产价格将会始终
保持升值。
金融危机与经济低迷……………………………………………………………………/188
对这场反常危机的分析…………………………………………………………………/210
参考文献…………………………………………………………………………………………224
缩略语和习惯用法………………………………………………………………………………234
《星期專論》小心台灣成為中國的邊陲
無能只是小罪 方向錯誤才是大罪
但 這種「無能論」,雖不能說不對,但卻太過表面,它缺少了歷史及思想的縱深。我認為台灣今日每況愈下,無能的解釋已太過簡單,更大的原因其實是無知無識,由 於無知無識,整個台灣已被帶到一個完全錯誤的方向,那就是近代「依賴理論」所說的「依賴而不發展」的現象,台灣已淪為「中心︱邊陲」這種政經秩序裡的邊 陲,而中國則是新的中心。正因為台灣已淪為邊陲,邊陲國家的特性,如資本技術及人力向中心移動,邊陲的薪資日益下滑,邊陲的階級化日益極端,整個社會的發 展更加向低技術、勞力更密集的方向移動等問題遂在台灣發生。無能只是個小罪過,把台灣帶到邊陲的方向,使台灣向下沉淪,累世不得翻身,那才是不可被原諒的 大罪!
因此,今天的台灣,可能已需要對當年的政治經濟學之「依賴理論」及「中心︱邊陲論」,重新撿回來加以理解了。所謂的「依賴理論」,乃 是一九五○至八○年代初,在西方及第三世界國家相當顯學的一種政治經濟學,當時有好多一流的學術大師,注意到世界上的極端不公平,於是他們從學理上來探討 這種不公平的起源,他們發現到,除了意識形態的支配外,已開發國家更透過許多經濟的詭論,而讓發展中國家自願的失去了主體性的追求,而去接受那個不公平的 分工秩序,而使發展中國家永遠在分工秩序的下端,而上端則永遠是西方的已開發國家,邊陲國家由於在國際分工秩序裡的下端,缺少了議價的籌碼,於是它只能向 低工資勞力密集的產業發展,因而註定了邊陲國家的發展走到階級化社會的方向。有鑒於發展中國家的此種命運,依賴理論的諸位大師,像埃及學者阿敏 (Samir Amin)等遂主張,發展中國家的政府一定要拚盡努力,開創本身的經濟自主性,有自己的高生產力的火車頭企業,讓自己的生產力提升。他們的觀點就是說政府 和企業都要更有志氣,更有自主性及決斷力。依賴理論據我所知,它對拉丁美洲的發展扮演了極大作用,整個拉丁美洲的近代發展,經濟和政治自主性的追求乃是它 的共同目標。
馬政府經濟政策思考 缺少自主性
而非常令人失 望的,馬政府的經濟政策思考,就是缺少了自主性這個最基本的要件,因此自馬上台後,遂全力發展與中國的經濟關係,他以為中國是最大的新興市場,依靠中國就 會有經濟政績,在ECFA的初期,由於中國還有人口紅利,加上中國自己的進口替代產業尚不完整,用馬政府的話來說,那就是兩岸尚有互補性,台灣的確得到出 口利益,台商也都賺到了許多。而且馬政府的開放所造成的台灣產業外移,也尚未到關鍵點,人們也都未重視,但這種對中國的依賴,最近這一、兩年已開始病徵出 現:
(一)它造成台灣產業的空洞化,台灣與中國的產業關係由互補性轉為競爭性,於是台灣對中國的出口遂大幅下滑。
(二)台灣產業的外移,其實也伴隨著台灣資金向中國大量流出,而沒有造成利潤回流,只不過產生一大群游牧式的富人階級,資金與技術外移而利潤不回流,這乃是依賴理論特別強調的一種邊陲現象。
吸走技術人力 台灣產業基礎淪喪
(三)繼產業及資金的抽吸後,現在已進一步的對台灣技術人力進行抽吸,這種情況假以時日,必造成台灣本身的枯乾化。它最好的結果,乃是台灣將缺乏自主的產業基礎,一個國家永續發展的能力也將淪喪。
(四) 在以前的依賴理論裡,它為了使邊陲國家安於邊陲,會將它的邊陲落後美化,說成是一種牧歌式的美好田園社會,而今天的台灣也正被這樣的美化,台灣是個有人情 味、服務品質良好的度假旅遊樂園,有特色小吃與點心,這種牧歌式的台灣被陸客吹捧,台灣官方也自鳴得意的在自我吹捧,台灣民間沒有別的可以自我肯定,當然 也對這種牧歌式的鄉愁大力宣揚。我不是說這些品質不重要,但高科技大國與小吃旅遊立國,畢竟是不一樣的。
我缺乏新核心產業 只能向下沉淪
因 此,今天的中國與台灣,其實已形成了一種「中心︱邊陲關係」,中國由於擁有市場力,它已藉著抽吸功能,而成為中心,馬政府卻很得意於自己成為邊陲。一個邊 陲社會最後只好依賴中心而生存,它必然國民收入日益降低,當台灣不再有新的核心產業成為經濟的生長點,台灣當然只得繼續向下沉淪。
我從未反對兩岸的經貿互動,但也從未支持過馬政府這種毫無自主性,從屬依賴的互動。今天台灣每況愈下,正在快速的倒退,這絕不只是無能而已,而是台灣的方向已全都錯了,錯誤之罪,其實比無能更甚。中國與台灣之間的這種「中心︱邊陲關係」,或許才是我們更該擔心的!
(作者南方朔為文化評論者)