Amazon.com: Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System---and Themselves (9780670021253): Andrew ...
作者的話 這本書是與直接參與到金融危機各事件的逾兩百位受訪者進行超過五百個小時的訪問,所得到的成果。受訪者包括華爾街的高層行政人員、董事會成員、管理層、 現任或前任公務員、外國政府官員、銀行家、律師、會計師、以及一些顧問。不少受訪者提供了「白紙黑字」的文件資料,包括筆記、電郵、錄音、內部報告、文件 草稿、講稿、行事曆、來電顯示、收費單據、開支報告……構成了書中細節的基礎。 他們有的更絞盡腦汁甚至花上數小時回憶會談中的一字一句,或者會議上的任何細節──不少會議只供特權人士知悉,甚至是機密。 有鑑於這些事件的爭議性──撰寫此書時,有幾件涉及刑事的調查仍在進行當中,更不用說數不清的民事訴訟案件──不少受訪者都以不具名、無法被追索身分的 形式提供資料。再考慮到每個場景都有不同人士參與重建、確認當時的實際情況,因此,每一個角色說出的每一句話,其資源來源可能是來自其他方面,例如在場的 其他與會者、透過擴音器參與電話會議的人士、或者由當場聽到當事人覆述情況的第三者,甚至當時的草稿、筆記資料──總的來說,並不一定由講者本人提供。 關於這次金融危機,坊間已有不少文字紀錄,而這本書是依據我的財經記者同事們的珍貴資料,這部份我會容後一一詳細列明。 但是,我希望在此提供的,是第一次把細節、以及無時無刻地追蹤這個歷史上最扣人心弦的災難,將之清楚地帶到世人眼前。提供資料的每一位人士,他們深信自己親眼看著經濟如何跌入深坑。 義大利偉大的科學家伽利略曾說:「所有被發現的真理都很容易被理解,重點是去發現它。」我希望我至少發現了一點點,也因此,可以讓過去幾年複雜的財經事件更容易被人理解。 譯者的話 動筆翻譯《大不能倒》是源於一股試它一試的衝動。這一念頭帶來的結果,是持續一百天的「筆戰」——每天早上四時半起床,爭取在上班前翻譯它三個小時;下 班回家趕緊完成家務,晚上九時開始,再奮鬥四個小時……日復一日,按編輯大人的囑咐每天苦戰五頁。我把所有的空閒活動置之度外,為的,只是希望能和我最好 的朋友盡早分享和討論書中內容。 作者安德魯.羅斯.索爾金(Andrew Ross Sorkin)擁有深邃的洞察力,這部厚墩墩的大作文風坦誠直率。不少人有先入為主的成見,以為索爾金這位出色的傳媒工作者,以其筆桿慣有的辛辣鋒利,此 作八成是一心羅列華爾街和華盛頓官商勾結的罪證;反而,作者是把二00八年金融海嘯的箇中關鍵人物,內心深處不足為外人道的恐懼、無援,深刻地勾畫並展現 在讀者的眼前,力圖做出一個公平、公正的紀錄。 儘管作者索爾金在美國主流媒體打滾多年,但翻開《大到不能倒》,讀者看到的卻是徹底違反 好萊塢公式的實況:傳媒並非秉持正義,堅持發掘「真相」;也沒有挺身而出為他人犧牲的英雄,反而是,主人翁個個都以受害者自居,滿腔的怨恨不知應向誰發 洩;同樣,所謂拯救世界經濟的英雄,其實不外是幾個急就章的臭皮匠湊得一個諸葛亮…… 華爾街是世界上把資本主義發揮得最淋漓盡致的地 方,就是一股求利的動力,竟可把來自不同種族、不同文化、不同信念、不同宗教……的各式人物牢牢地團結在一起。完成交易是銀行家天生的本能,為了完成交 易,再不可能發生的妥協都變為可能──原來,利之當頭,真正的世界大同可展現在世人面前……原來,利益的熙來攘往力量之大,絕對凌駕在種族、宗教和政治立 場……的芥蒂之上。 不過,令譯者最為感動的是,儘管金融界被一場海嘯弄得人仰馬翻,但在索爾金的筆下,人人仍盡力堅守崗位:不論是基層 員工或國際級風雲人物,每人都是各為其主(這主可能是自己),在可能是一生最大的徬徨焦慮中仍克盡己任,在這場驚天動地的金融海嘯中咬緊牙關捍衛個人、美 國、全球不同政權和經濟體系內各階層的利益。 另一觸動譯者之處,是作者對人的尊重。在這個世界上,人們總習慣前仆後繼地記錄「偉人」的 一舉一動,其他的大多數人物就統統被埋入所謂無名英雄記念碑,其實是偉人的背後,有不少同事、下屬……各式人等一直鞠躬盡瘁地供「偉人」如牛馬驅策──在 索爾金這本暢銷全球的金融故事書中,作者記錄的除了鮑爾森、蓋特納、柏南克外,還包括幾個月來一同苦撐的聯儲、財政部的隊伍,以及業界的一眾人物,就是這 一點一滴的故事讓人動容——It makes it real and it makes it so much more human.
大到不能倒(Too Big to Fail,縮寫TBTF)是一個經濟學上的概念,指當一些規模極大或在產業中具有關鍵性重要地位的企業瀕臨破產時,政府不能等閒視之,甚至要不惜投入公帑相救,以避免那些企業倒閉後所掀起的巨大連鎖反應造成社會整體更嚴重的傷害,這種情況即稱為「大到不能倒」。
"Too big to fail" is a term of art in regulation and public policy that refers to businesses dealing with market complications related to moral hazard, economic specialization, and monetary theory. Entities are considered to be "too big to fail" by those who believe those entities are so central to a macroeconomy that their failure will be disastrous to an economy, and as such believe they should become recipients of beneficial financial and economic policies from governments and/or central banks.[1] It is thought that companies that fall into this category take positions that are high-risk, as they are able to leverage these risks based on the policy preference they receive.[2] The term has emerged as prominent in public discourse since the 2007–2010 global financial crisis. Some critics see the policy as counterproductive and that large banks or other institutions should be left to fail if their risk management is not effective.[3][4] Moreover, some assert that the "too big to fail" policy has been explicitly refuted in the People's Republic of China, with the bankruptcy of Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corporation in 1998.[5] Some economists, such as Nobel LaureatePaul Krugman don't see it as necessarily a bad thing, with economy of scale in banks, as in other businesses, as worth preserving, so long as they are well regulated, in proportion to their economic clout.[6][7][8][9]
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Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout That Never Was
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Lehman’s headquarters on its bankruptcy day in 2008.CreditMark Lennihan/Associated Press
Inside the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, time was running out to answer a question that would change Wall Street forever.
At issue that September, six years ago, was whether the Fed could save a major investment bank whose failure might threaten the entire economy.
The firm was Lehman Brothers. And the answer for some inside the Fed was yes, the government could bail out Lehman, according to new accounts by Fed officials who were there at the time.
But as the world now knows, no one rescued Lehman. Instead, the firm was allowed to collapse overnight, a decision that, in cool hindsight, let problems at one bank snowball into a full-blown panic. By the time it was over, nearly every other major bank had to be saved.
Why, given all that happened, was Lehman the only bank that was not too big to fail? For the first time, Fed officials have offered an account that differs significantly from the versions that, for many, have hardened into history.
Ben S. Bernanke, the Fed chairman at the time, Henry M. Paulson Jr., the former Treasury Secretary, and Timothy F. Geithner, who was then president of the New York Fed, have all argued that Lehman Brothers was in such a deep hole from its risky real estate investments that Fed did not have the legal authority to rescue it.
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Richard S. Fuld Jr., center, chief of Lehman Brothers, was heckled by protesters after testifying to Congress in October 2008 about the collapse.CreditSusan Walsh/Associated Press
But now, interviews with current and former Fed officials show that a group inside New York Fed was leaning toward the opposite conclusion — that Lehman was narrowly solvent and therefore might qualify for a bailout. In the frenetic events of what has become known as the Lehman weekend, that preliminary analysis never reached senior officials before they decided to let Lehman fail.
Understanding why Lehman was allowed to die goes beyond apportioning responsibility for the financial crisis and the recession that cost millions of ordinary Americans jobs and savings. Today, long after the bailouts, the debate rages over the Fed’s authority to bail out failing firms. Some Fed officials worry that when the next financial crisis comes, the Fed will have less power to shield the financial system from the failure of a single large bank. After the Lehman debacle, Congress curbed the Fed’s ability to rescue a bank in trouble.
Whether to save Lehman came down to a crucial question: Did Lehman have enough solid assets to back a loan from the Fed? Finding the answer fell to two teams of financial experts at the New York Fed. Those teams had provisionally concluded that Lehman might, in fact, be a candidate for rescue, but members of those teams said they never briefed Mr. Geithner, who said he did not know of the results.
“My colleagues at the New York Fed were careful and creative, and as demonstrated through the crisis that fall, we were willing to go to extraordinary lengths to try to protect the economy from the unfolding financial disaster,” Mr. Geithner said Monday in a statement to The New York Times. “We explored all available alternatives to avoid a collapse of Lehman, but the size of its losses were so great that they were unable to attract a buyer, and we were unable to lend on a scale that would save them.”
Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Paulson said in recent interviews with The Times that they did not know about the Fed analysis or its conclusions.
Interviews with half a dozen Fed officials, who spoke on the condition they not be named, so as not to breach the Fed’s unofficial vow of silence, suggest some Fed insiders believed that the government had the authority to throw Lehman Brothers a lifeline, even if the bank was nearly broke. The Fed earlier came to the rescue of Bear Stearns, after doing little analysis, and only days later saved the American International Group. The government subsequently saved the likes of Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Ultimately, whether Lehman should have gotten Fed support was a judgment call, not a matter of strict statute, these people said.ontinue reading the main story
Financial Turmoil in 2008 …
MARCH 14, 2008
The Federal Reserve provides financial backing
to JPMorgan Chase’s purchase of Bear Stearns.
JUNE 9
Lehman Brothers reports a second-quarter
loss of $2.8 billion.
JULY 11
The Treasury Department general counsel writes in
an email that the Fed has “plenty of legal authority to
provide liquidity” to Lehman.
JULY 15
In an email, William C. Dudley of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York outlines a plan for the Fed to take
$60 billion of assets off Lehman’s balance sheet.
… and Crisis
September
The federal government bails out
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
7
The heads of Wall Street firms gather at the
New York Fed to look for ways to end the
Lehman crisis. The Treasury secretary tells
the participants that no government money
can be used in any rescue.
12
Attempts are made to arrange a Barclays
purchase of Lehman, but fall through the
next day.
13
Lehman files for bankruptcy.
15
The Fed announces an $85 billion bailout of
the American International Group.
16
OCT. 3
Congress passes the Troubled Asset Relief
Program, enabling the government to take big
equity stakes in banks.
OCT. 8
The Fed creates a second bailout facility for
A.I.G., worth $38 billion.
“We had lawyers joined at our hips,” said one participant. “And they were very helpful at framing the issues. But they never said we couldn’t do it.”
As another participant put it, “It was a policy and political decision, not a legal decision.”
A Wall Street Watershed
The account from the New York Fed officials provides new insight into a dangerous moment in Wall Street history. Countless financial figures — from Wall Street chiefs to government policy makers — have said that allowing Lehman to die the way it did was a misjudgment that inflicted unnecessary pain.
“There is close to universal agreement that the demise of Lehman Brothers was the watershed event of the entire financial crisis and that the decision to allow it to fail was the watershed decision,” Alan S. Blinder, an economics professor at Princeton and former vice chairman of the Fed, wrote in his history of the financial crisis, “After the Music Stopped.”
“The Fed has explained the decision as a legal issue,” Mr. Blinder said in an interview. “But is that true or valid? Is it enough? Those are important questions.”
Photo
“I will maintain to my deathbed that we made every effort to save Lehman, but we were just unable to do so because of a lack of legal authority,” said Ben S. Bernanke, in an interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on Nov. 17, 2009.CreditShawn Thew/European Pressphoto Agency
Whether the Fed should have tried to save Lehman is still a subject of heated debate. And it is unclear whether the firm could have been rescued at all.
What happened that September was the culmination of circumstances reaching back years — of ordinary people too eager to borrow, of banks too eager to lend and of Wall Street financial engineers reaping multimillion-dollar bonuses. Even so, saving Lehman from complete collapse might have shielded the economy from what turned out to be a crippling blow. And as the subsequent rescue of A.I.G., the insurance giant, demonstrated, a rescue could have included substantial protections for taxpayers.
Back in 2008, the Fed possessed broad authority to lend to banks in trouble. Section 13-3 of the Federal Reserve Act provided that “in unusual and exigent circumstances” the Fed could lend to any institution, as long as the loan was “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve Bank.” In the eyes of the Fed, that means a firm must be solvent and have adequate collateral to lend against, and making that determination was the responsibility of the New York Fed, the regional Fed bank that had begun to assume responsibility for Lehman. On that September weekend, teams from the New York Fed were told to assess Lehman’s solvency and collateral.
Whether and how much the Fed could lend Lehman depended on those teams’ findings, although the final decision rested with Mr. Geithner, Mr. Bernanke and the Federal Reserve Board.
A Question of Valuation
In recent interviews, members of the teams said that Lehman had considerable assets that were liquid and easy to value, like United States Treasury securities. The question was Lehman’s illiquid assets — primarily a real estate portfolio that Lehman had recently valued at $50 billion. By Lehman’s account, the firm had a surplus of assets over liabilities of $28.4 billion.
Photo
“Let me also say, for the record, strongly: There was no authority, there was no law that would have let us save Lehman Brothers,” said Henry M. Paulson Jr., at the House Committee on Financial Services on Nov. 18, 2008.CreditAlex Wong/Getty Images
Others had already taken a stab at valuing Lehman’s troubled assets. Kenneth D. Lewis, then the chief executive of Bank of America — who, with the government’s encouragement, was considering a bid for Lehman — asserted that Lehman had a “$66 billion hole” in its balance sheet.
A group of bankers summoned to the Fed by Mr. Paulson, who was hoping they would mount a private rescue, did not accept Lehman’s $50 billion valuation for its real estate and could not decide whether Lehman was solvent. But potential private rescuers had a motive to lowball Lehman’s value. Fed officials involved in the valuation stressed that the Fed could hold distressed assets for much longer than private parties, allowing time for those assets to recover in value. Also, because the Fed sets monetary policy, it exerts enormous influence over the assets’ ultimate value.
“There can’t be any reasonable doubt that had the Fed rescued Lehman, that very act would have pushed up the value of its assets,” Mr. Blinder said.
While the Fed team did not come up with a precise value for Lehman’s illiquid assets, it provided a range that was far more generous in its valuations than the private sector had been.
“It was close,” a member of the Fed team that evaluated the collateral said. “Folks were aware of how ambiguous these values are, especially at a time of crisis. So it becomes a policy question: Do you want to take a chance or not?”
Argument continues today over the value of Lehman’s assets. A report compiled by Anton R. Valukas, a Chicago lawyer, at the behest of the bankruptcy court overseeing Lehman concluded in 2010 that nearly all of the firm’s real estate valuations were reasonable. It also suggested that Lehman’s chaotic bankruptcy caused many of the losses later borne by the firm’s creditors. Other analysts have argued that Lehman was deeply insolvent.
Photo
“We didn’t believe we had the legal authority to guarantee Lehman’s trading liabilities, even using our ‘unusual and exigent’ powers,” said Timothy F. Geithner, in “Stress Test,” his 2014 book on the financial crisis.CreditKevin Lamarque/Reuters
Ultimately, the appraisals of the New York Fed teams did not matter. Their preliminary finding was that Lehman was solvent and that what it faced was essentially a bank run, according to members of the group. Researchers working on the value of Lehman’s collateral said they thought they would be delivering those findings to Mr. Geithner that September weekend.
But Mr. Geithner had already been diverted to A.I.G., which was facing its own crisis. In the end, the team members said, they delivered their findings orally to other New York Fed officials, including Michael F. Silva, Mr. Geithner’s chief of staff.
On Sunday, Mr. Bernanke was in Washington awaiting the New York Fed’s verdict. In a phone call, Mr. Geithner said Lehman could not be saved.
The Fed would be lending into a run, Mr. Geithner told Mr. Bernanke, according to both men’s accounts. In a recent interview, Mr. Bernanke said, “Knowing the potential consequences of Lehman’s failure, I was 100 percent committed to doing whatever could possibly and legally be done to save the company, as were Tim and Hank.” Mr. Paulson has concurred, saying, “Although it was Ben and Tim’s decision to make, I shared their view that Lehman was insolvent, and I know the marketplace did.”
Those at the Fed who have contended that Lehman was insolvent have never provided any basis for that conclusion, other than references to the estimates of Wall Street firms and other anecdotal evidence. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission asked for such evidence several times, but the Fed never provided it. The members of the New York Fed teams said that they did not prepare a formal, written report, and that no one asked them for any notes or work papers or asked them to elaborate on their findings. Scott G. Alvarez, the Fed’s general counsel, told the commission that there was “no time” that weekend for a written analysis.
‘A Lack of Legal Authority’
Phil Angelides, the crisis commission’s chairman, said no one ever mentioned the New York Fed analysis during his hearings. “If in fact the analysis existed and was independent, it would have been in everyone’s interest to have that out, even if it were in the form of notes,” Mr. Angelides said in an interview. He added, “If you look at the record, there is no legal stopper,” meaning a legal barrier.
Mr. Paulson has said that politics did not enter into the decision. But he had endured months of criticism for bailing out Bear Stearns in March 2008, and the outcry only intensified after the Treasury provided support to the mortgage finance giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in the first week of September. During a conference call on the Thursday before Lehman’s collapse, Mr. Paulson declared to Mr. Bernanke, Mr. Geithner and other regulators that he would not use public money to rescue Lehman, saying he did not want to be known as “Mr. Bailout.”
In written testimony before Congress that September, Mr. Bernanke made no mention of any legal constraint. Instead, he said, “We judged that investors and counterparties had had time to take precautionary measures.”
It was only on Oct. 7, after early praise for the decision to let Lehman fail had turned into a wave of criticism, that anyone mentioned the legal argument. In a speech that day, Mr. Bernanke said, “Neither the Treasury nor the Federal Reserve had the authority to commit public money in that way.” Mr. Paulson first mentioned the claim a week later. In an interview, Mr. Bernanke said, “We made a deliberative decision to be very cautious about publicizing our inability to save Lehman out of concern that it would further worsen the market panic.” Mr. Paulson made the same point. Mr. Bernanke was emphatic before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2009: “I will maintain to my deathbed that we made every effort to save Lehman, but we were just unable to do so because of a lack of legal authority.”
Mr. Bernanke and others have said that a Fed lifeline to Lehman might not have stopped the run on the firm. But others have said the point of Rule 13-3 was exactly that — to stop such panics.
“Of course the Fed can stop a run,” said Mr. Blinder, the economist. “That’s what it’s all about.”
Scholars are still struggling with the claim that the Fed could not rescue Lehman but was nonetheless able to save Bear Stearns and A.I.G.
What is clear to Mr. Blinder, he says, is that the decision was a formula for panic.
“The inconsistency was the biggest problem,” Mr. Blinder said. “The Lehman decision abruptly and surprisingly tore the perceived rule book into pieces and tossed it out the window.”